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Ministerial careers can be notoriously nasty, brutish, and short, with the doctrine of ministerial accountability leading
to numerous prematurely ended political careers. But how do European democracies compare? Looking at evidence
from seven countries, Jonathan Bright, Holger Doring, and Conor Little show that younger ministers survive
longer, right-wing parties are more likely to dump ministers than left-wing ones, and that large coalitions offer
greater stability for ministers.
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The recent UK general election surprised everyone by producing a familiar result: a majority government. Once the
norm, majority governments are expected to be increasingly rare in the UK as the country transitions to a multi-party
system; though it might seem exceptional now, the Lib-Con coalition which ruled until 2015 may come to be
remembered as the first of many. With other traditionally majority rule countries such as Spain moving in a similar
direction (few expect either PSOE or PP to be able to govern by themselves after the next general election),
coalition politics may be set to dominate European democracy for the foreseeable future. The increasing importance
of coalition politics has stimulated a varied literature on the dynamics of coalition stability. Stability is a key issue in
democratic politics; increasingly so in the context of current European turbulence. Too little stability and government
may be weak and ineffectual, without the time to come to grips with power or enact key legislation. Too much and
government may become corrupt and sclerotic, out of touch with the needs of the voters.
Interest in the stability of coalition governments has itself prompted a research agenda on the careers of individual
ministers (see here for a good summary), which stems from the realisation that they are not necessarily going to be
coterminous with individual governments. Ministers can easily outlast coalitions: for example, a Liberal-Labour
government, which appeared a possibility in the months leading up the election, would have apparently constituted
a significant change in UK politics, but it might also have returned a large number of Liberal ministers to their posts.
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However, ministers also face a variety of non-electoral threats to their office: poor performance, scandal, or simply a
desire to reshuffle government may also lead them to being moved on. Furthermore, without being sacked, ministers
may be moved around to a new job, perhaps promoted, perhaps given a more minor brief. In short, political
turbulence at the party level might disguise significant stability at the ministerial level; or vice versa.
This potential disconnect between party and ministerial politics makes it important to explore the reasons why some
ministers are able to remain in power longer than others, something we tackle in a recent research paper in West
European Politics. One of the things which has held back the study of ministerial careers availability of comparative,
cross national data. For the paper, we built a novel dataset covering seven European countries in the period 1945 –
2011 based on the list of ministers maintained by Lars Sonntag, supplemented with data scraped from the Wikipedia
pages of ministers. All data was validated manually by the research team. We link these data to portfolio salience
scores developed by Druckman and Warwick, which allowed us to build a systematic picture of not only which
positions people hold, but how powerful they were.
Figure 1: Length of ministerial careers in different European democracies
The dataset constructed provided a number of intriguing possibilities for the study of ministerial careers. The
average minister spends 3.6 years in government (see figure 1), though this varied widely between countries:
Finnish ministers stuck around for just 1.8 years, whilst Luxemburgish ministers were typically in power for almost 6
years. Furthermore, while the majority of ministers were in power for these relatively short periods; but a select few
remained in government for decades, for example during Sweden’s period of stable government following World
War Two. These ministers, who remain in the posts as long as monarchs, are positioned to have significant
influence on their country.
Figure 2: Ministerial power transfer in European democracies over time
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As we measure the relative importance of each position, the dataset also allows us to visualise the extent to which
power changes hands in different countries at different times (see figure 2). Major shifts in the makeup of
government are sometimes described as political “earthquakes”: if that’s the case, this provides a kind of political
seismometer. We can see instantly, for example, that countries such as Austria, Iceland and Luxembourg are
relatively stable; whereas Finland experiences frequent, major power shifts and Ireland experienced very high
turnover during a period of instability in the 1980s.
Finally, the dataset allowed us to explore some analytical questions: why do some ministers stay in power longer
than others? We find that younger ministers are more likely to survive for longer, as are ministers in more important
positions. We notice different dynamics in different parties, with right wing parties more likely to remove ministers
than left wing ones while in government. Women were also more likely to leave their post while their party remained
in power, though overall their careers were of comparable length to male ministers. Furthermore, larger coalitions
appear to offer greater stability for ministers (even if they are often less stable for governments).
These findings nuance in important ways our understanding of what it means to have a stable government, and the
forces that drive stability at the level of the individual minister.
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